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Contract, Crowd, Corpus 
and Plasma: 
Architectural and social assemblages
Carl Douglas
This paper springs from Joseph Rykwert’s observation, in On Adam’s House in 
Paradise (1981), of a conceptual correlation between Marc-Antoine Laugier and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It discerns, in the condition of joints in Laugier’s Essay 
on Architecture (1753) and social bonds in Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), an un-
derlying structural logic: what I will call an implicit theory of assemblage. From 
this initial reference point in the mid-eighteenth century, the paper moves to 
consider theories of crowds in the late nineteenth century as implicit theories 
of assemblage, and ultimately advocates the work of Gabriel Tarde as a basis for 
explicitation of these underlying theories.1
Contractual obligations
“Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.” The Social Contract begins 
with chains, and remains entangled in questions of binding (Rousseau 1968: 49). 
The chain is a fi gure of arbitrary constraint, and is represented as something to 
be thrown off. But in Rousseau’s text it is not a matter of aspiring to a state of 
absolute unconstraint. The very concept of society, of a social order, implies some 
kind or degree of attachment, and it is the proper form of this attachment that is 
the concern of The Social Contract.
Rousseau makes a primary distinction between the arbitrary bond of the chain 
and the natural bond of the family, “the oldest of all societies, and the only natu-
ral one” (1968: 50). The child is bound to the father by necessity (the maternal 
bond is never raised), and once the child becomes independent, this bond dis-
solves: the child and father are freed from this relation and, if it persists, it is by 
mutual consent: “If they continue to remain united, it is no longer nature, but 
their own choice, which unites them; and the family as such is kept in being 
only by agreement” (50). In this shift from dependence to agreement, Rousseau 
locates the shift from the natural to the social. All legitimate authority, asserts 
Rousseau, must be based on agreement, and he sets himself the task of describ-
ing a society of this kind. Rousseau, who has occasionally been misunderstood 
as advocating a return to nature, actually describes the social as a second na-
ture.2 Natural order does not authorise social order. Social order must consist of 
covenants, freely entered into. 
As Mark Wigley points out, Rousseau explicitly describes the constitution of so-
cial order as a building project, for which the ground must be cleared and tested, 
the structure carefully maintained, and collapse avoided, “as an architect who 
puts up a large building fi rst surveys the ground to see if it can bear the weight” 
(Rousseau 1968: 88; see Wigley 1993: 133). The state is a collective identity formed 
by very specifi c relationships between individual elements. By freely entering 
1. Although French sources are predomi-
nant in this paper, I believe the applicabil-
ity of this study is not exclusively limited 
to France. However, the development of 
theories of social cohesion was particu-
larly strong in France due to the experi-
ence of the revolutions. See Moscovici 
(1985) and van Ginneken (1992). ‘Explici-
tation’ is Sloterdijk’s term (2005).
2. See Lovejoy (1923), who points out 
that the term ‘nature‘ in Rousseau‘s writ-
ing has a number of meanings that must 
be distinguished. In The Social Contract, 
as in the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau 
does not look back to an idyllic past, but 
seeks to disclose the moment at which 
nature and culture become discrete.
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into the social contract, an aggregate is formed, a corporate body, a “public per-
son ... once called the city” (61). This agglomeration is given its internal cohe-
sion by the social contract to which each individual subscribes. The contract is 
the fundamental joint, the bond or bind by which the entire social edifi ce takes 
shape and holds together. The social body acquires unity, life and will.
Although a social whole is formed, however, the parts must remain autonomous, 
such that each individual has a private will distinct from the general will: “His 
private interest may speak with a very different voice from that of the public 
interest” (63). This freedom runs to the extent that the individual may at any time 
withdraw from the contract entirely. Society exists only so long as the social con-
tract is freely maintained by its constituents. The freedom to renounce society is 
essential. The joints of Rousseau’s social structure must not be bound or fused. 
There cannot be forceful constraints in the social contract.
Rousseau’s social contract is in many respects a gloss on Hobbes’ Leviathan 
(1651). Hobbes proposed that the state should be conceived as a collective body, 
of which the sovereign was the head. The famous frontispiece of Hobbes’ treatise 
(Fig. 1) shows what he had in mind: a body comprised of individual humans as 
cells, all looking up towards the sovereign. Apart from his insistence on the right 
to withdraw from the collective, Rousseau’s innovation is in shifting focus from 
the exterior relations to interior relations. Where Hobbes begins with the image 
of a human organism, and proceeds to show how society can be fi tted into this 
authorising metaphor, Rousseau begins with individual connections, and attem
pts to discover what the whole body might look like.3 Put simply, where Hobbes 
tendentiously assumed the primacy of social form, Rousseau was concerned with 
social formation.4 
Joseph Rykwert has suggested a correlation between Rousseau’s primitivism 
and that of his contemporary, Marc-Antoine Laugier. The famous frontispiece 
image of Laugier’s Essay on Architecture (Fig. 2) is one of the key coordinates for 
3. There is a useful criticism of the “organ-
ismal metaphor” in De Landa (2006: 8-12).
4. For a fuller discussion of the spatial-
ity of power-relations in Hobbes’s Levia-
than, see McEwen (2007).
Fig. 2: Frontispiece to 2nd ed. of Essay on Architecture, 
Marc-Antoine Laugier, 1755
Fig. 1: Frontispiece to Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes, 1651
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Rykwert’s study of the idea of the primitive hut in architectural theory, On Adam’s 
House in Paradise. Laugier proposes that the basic elements of the classical tradi-
tion in architecture are already present in an imagined primitive scene: seek-
ing environmental control over light, heat, dampness and air, a primitive man 
fi nds four trees arranged in a square, and constructs a raised roof, thus inventing 
column, entablature, and gable. Rykwert writes, “Allowing for the inevitable 
differences between the two men, and the differing scale of their enterprises, 
this view of the authority of the primitive hut is not unlike that which Rous-
seau attributed to the family as the archetype of social organisation” (1981: 44). 
In his The Contribution of Art and Science to the Refi nement of Manners, Rousseau 
describes in parallel the socialisation of human beings, and the degenerate elabo-
ration of architecture: 
Here is a calm riverbank, dressed by the hand of unaided nature, 
towards which the eye turns constantly, and which you leave with 
regret ... then came the height of degradation, and vice was never 
carried so far as when it was seen, to speak fi guratively, supported by 
marble columns and engraved on Corinthian capitals. (Rykwert 1981: 
46-47)
How to house human beings properly is a question allied to that of proper 
social relations. In his drawing for the second edition of the Essay on Architecture, 
Laugier’s hut is conspicuous for its structural self-suffi ciency. The individual 
elements – the still-living columns, the cross beams and the rafters – all rest 
together naturally, without pins or bonds (Fig. 3). The four tree-columns have 
been pruned, and the stumps of the branches become brackets to support the 
beams. The trees retain their leafy growth, except possibly for the front left tree, 
which looks as if it has been trimmed back to the trunk. The rafter branches sit 
up at an improbably steep angle. They rest on the beams without any evident 
support: under close inspection, the expected bindings are found to be absent, 
and the rafters do not appear to be notched onto the beams. At the ridge, the 
rafters rest against one another (Fig. 4). A ridge-beam is possibly hinted at, but 
looks as if it is suspended under the rafters rather than providing any substan-
tive support. Again, there is no hint that the rafters are bound or pinned together 
at the top; and they cannot be interwoven, because the branches are conspicu-
ously thick and blunt. Perhaps the gesture of Architecture personifi ed in the 
foreground could be re-interpreted as a gesture of blame for the collapse of the 
Fig. 3: Detail of Fig. 2, showing column-entablature joint Fig. 4: Detail of Fig. 2, showing ridge joint
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Ionic edifi ce in the foreground that has attempted to follow the structural logic 
of Laugier’s hut – in which case it is no wonder that the cherub appears shocked.
It is evident, of course, that Laugier did not intend his hut to be understood 
as an exemplar of construction practice, but as a moral “fi rst model” (Laugier 
1756: 11). It is used to demonstrate the essential elements of architecture, and to 
exclude those elements that are superfl uous additions, “essential defects” (12). 
It performs the same role (and has the same anthropological non-specifi city5) as 
Rousseau’s primitive family. But to point out the strange condition of the joints 
in Laugier’s image is not entirely perverse – his model does, after all, deliberately 
express principles of construction. And, in fact, the disjointedness of Laugier’s 
hut is entirely consistent with his thinking about architectural attachment, and 
the relationship between part and whole. In the Essay on Architecture, there is 
little written directly concerning joints. Jointing may be amongst those details 
with which Laugier felt disinclined “to load this little work” for fear they might 
“trouble and distaste the reader” (xvi). Connection and attachment are, however, 
important sub-themes of Laugier’s text.
In the chapter of his essay that directly addresses construction, the strength of a 
building is said to depend on the choice of good material, disposed with consid-
eration of load-paths and bearing. Laugier writes, “There are three things which 
render a wall strong and immoveable. The foundation upon which it bears its 
thickness, the connection and right line of its parts” (138). It is obvious that in his 
text he has in mind one type of joint, stacked masonry: this is in spite of what he 
has asserted about the timber origins of architecture. Stones are to be laid accu-
rately and tightly, “that there may be no void in the thickness of the wall” (141), 
and the use of mortar, a concession, is to be minimised. Laugier’s ideal structure 
would be held together by nothing other than gravity. Beams are “laid” on the 
columns. Columns are to “bear immediately upon the pavement, as the pillars of 
the rustic cabin bear immediately on the ground” (15).
For Laugier, working from the model of his primitive hut, the column was the 
only proper means of bearing vertical loads. Walls were to be treated as infi ll 
panels, concerned solely with sealing up a spatial envelope. Engaged columns 
are only permitted as a “licence authorised by necessity” (16), but must not be 
lost into the mass of the wall – they should be engaged “a fourth part at most ... 
so that even in their use they may always retain something of that air of freedom 
and disengagement” (16). For Laugier, parts must remain distinct, even while 
they form an integrated architectural body. They must be seen to be distinct (as 
the columns must be seen to be distinct from the wall), and they should need a 
minimum of concern for attachment: there is an expected natural co-dependence 
of parts. The disconnection of parts, which Laugier encourages, could be 
seen as a foundational principle for later tectonic conceptions of the joint, the 
role and expression of which became one of the central preoccupations of mod-
ernist architecture.6 
Laugier and Rousseau share more than an authorising appeal to a fi ctional 
primitive scene. Both idealise connections in the same way, envisaging a kind 
of joint that is held together without binding. Their respective edifi ces, social 
and architectural, are complete wholes comprised of individual elements, which 
must remain free and discrete, even as they constitute this wholeness. Both edi-
fi ces are only conceivable on the basis of a very particular mereology. The joint 
is primitive, in the sense that it is taken to emerge from primitive social and 
5. Rykwert writes that Rousseau‘s natu-
ral origin exists “in the notational rather 
than in the paleontological sense“ (1981: 
47-8), and this is true of Laugier‘s also.
6. See Frampton (1995).
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technical conditions. Although these conditions place the joint close to nature, 
the joint itself is not understood as natural, except insofar as rationalism is natu-
ral. For Rousseau, there are three joints: the paternal bond, the agreement and 
the chain. The fi rst is natural and primitive, the second rational and natural, 
the third unnatural and irrational. The social contract is of the second of these 
orders. Laugier fumbles the question of origin by treating it over-literally, but 
he too seeks to authorise architectural production by demonstrating it to be a 
rational and natural assembly.
Crowds as a source of anxiety
Rykwert’s observed correlation indicates the presence of an underlying philoso-
phy or logic of part-whole relationships: an implicit theory of assemblage. This 
theory structures Rousseau’s politics and Laugier’s theory of architecture. It was 
problematised, if not superseded, by the emergence of the crowd. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, Europe looked back to Rousseau through a hundred 
years of episodic revolutions, particularly in France. By jumping to the end of 
this traumatic period, it will become clear just how drastically this underlying 
philosophy had shifted.7
In the nineteenth century the behaviour of collectives, in particular the crowd, 
became a crucial concern. Associated through revolutionary actions with vio-
lence and unrest, it was a source of bourgeois anxiety. During this period, dis-
courses of sociology, criminology, politics, economics, psychology and urban-
ism are all heavily marked, and in some cases redefi ned, by a new concern for 
crowds. In 1895 Gustav Le Bon introduced his book The Crowd: A Study of the 
Popular Mind by noting the urgency of a satisfactory account of collective behav-
iour. He did this with an accusatory barb aimed at Rousseau and his philoso-
phical descendants:
Today the claims of the masses are becoming more and more sharply 
defi ned, and amount to nothing less than a determination to destroy 
utterly society as it now exists, with a view to making it hark back to 
that primitive communism which was the normal condition of all hu-
man groups before the dawn of civilisation. (Le Bon 2001: 9)8
Where Rousseau’s collectives are essentially the product of rational minds, 
Le Bon’s are essentially irrational. The crowd, Le Bon argues, is a psycho-
logical entity:
Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circum-
stances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very 
different from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments 
and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same di-
rection, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind 
is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defi ned 
characteristics ... It forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of 
the mental unity of crowds. (2001: 13)
Like Rousseau, Le Bon is concerned with the formation of a greater unity from 
individual elements, and in both cases there is an appeal to a primitive state of 
humanity. But while for Rousseau this is a matter of agreement and elevates hu-
mans, for Le Bon it is a matter of instinct and degrades them. In becoming part 
of the crowd, an individual regresses atavistically to a barbaric state. 
7. The revolutionary century began with 
the French Revolution of 1789, and in-
cluded the July Days of 1830, the Febru-
ary and July Revolutions of 1848, and the 
Paris Commune of 1871, as well as many 
smaller uprisings. Moscovici writes, “If 
crowd psychology was born in France 
rather than in Italy or Germany, it was 
because of the effect of the simultaneous 
existence of waves of revolutions and 
the appearance of schools of hypnosis, 
the aftermath, so to speak, of the Paris 
Commune and the Nancy hospitals or 
the Saltpêtrière“ (1985: 82).
8. Le Bon, of course, misunderstands 
Rousseau. See note 2 above.
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By the mere fact that he forms part of an organised crowd, a man de-
scends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation. Isolated, he may be 
a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian – that is a crea-
ture acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the 
ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings, 
whom he further tends to resemble by the facility with which he al-
lows himself to be impressed by words and images – which would be 
entirely without action on each of the isolated individuals composing 
the crowd. (2001: 19)
The subjection of the individual psyche to the crowd is understood by Le Bon as 
an actual physical effect on the body. The individual does not retain autonomy, 
as it does in Rousseau’s society. The body enters a special state close to that of 
hypnosis, in which the higher functions of the brain are suppressed. A collective 
persona is formed, but this is no society, merely a crowd. A crowd is therefore 
a state of collapse of the individual, willing, subject. A crowd attains its mental 
unity at the expense of individual civility. In Le Bon’s view, essentially rational 
civilised individuals degenerate through the formation of crowds, becoming 
savage, mentally weak, and violent. Rousseau’s view is less stark. On their own, 
humans are savage but, for Rousseau, this also means they are free. The forma-
tion of social structures allows the arrival of civility, even as it entails certain 
vices. There is a loss of savage individualist innocence. There is thus a funda-
mental disagreement between Le Bon and Rousseau about the state of savagery: 
for Rousseau the savage is innocent and free, but for Le Bon he is animalistic and 
irrational. More importantly, from the point of view of the structure of the collec-
tive, Rousseau’s society is jointed without constraint, while Le Bon’s crowds have 
entered a state of subjection.
The idea that the crowd is something to be mistrusted and feared was shared by 
many in the later nineteenth century. Baron Haussmann’s restructuring of Paris 
was motivated by a concern for social order and anxiety about crowds. His urban 
surgery aimed to clarify, de-densify, and provide a spatial hierarchy to chaotic 
Paris, suggesting a direct correlation between the social patterns that lead to 
revolution and the spatial organisation of the city: “We have to attack the old 
neighbourhoods head on ... we have to force the population away from the centre 
[à une excentricité favorable] ... we have to have the audacity to remake ‘quartiers’ 
from top to bottom» (Jordan 1995: 110). In the 1860s, a memo from Haussmann’s 
offi ce worried that Paris had become fi lled with:
a fl oating mass of workers who have come to the city [today], ready to 
leave tomorrow, of families whose members are dispersed through-
out the city by their diverse places of work, of nomad renters who are 
incessantly moving from quarter to quarter, without knowing a fi xed 
residence or a patrimonial place. It is an accumulation of men who are 
strangers to each other, who are attracted only by impressions and the 
most deplorable suggestions, who have no mind of their own, since 
they are not dominated by a strong national feeling (217).
There is no governing structure to this population. They do not have any partic-
ular allegiance to place, have fl uid connections to each other, and the institutions 
of the city, and act animally, according to mere stimulations of their senses. Of 
course, the anxiety in Haussmann’s offi ce is directly related to the experiences 
of the barricades. These provisional structures, thrown up across the narrow 
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streets of Paris, had been a dominant feature of the revolutionary uprisings of 
1830 and 1848. Comprised of detritus and repurposed urban materials (pavers, 
gates, street furniture, rubble), they had reconfi gured the power-relations en-
coded into the city (Fig. 5). Part of Haussmann’s intent in modernising Paris with 
wide, clean boulevards, was to discipline this unruly material, and hinder the 
agglomerative architecture of the barricades from forming. Barricades are not 
constructed so much as they accumulate, and it is precisely in this sense that 
they refl ect the properties of the crowd mistrusted by Le Bon and Haussmann: 
fl uidity, lack of ties, and expedient relationship to place.9 
There is a symptomatic difference in conceptions of collective action between 
Rousseau and Haussmann. For the eighteenth-century philosopher, the collec-
tive is a desired construction, and the task at hand is the defi nition and institu-
tion of proper social relations. For the nineteenth-century urbanist, the collective 
provokes unease, and the task at hand is the prophylactic, or at least palliative, 
disciplining of the materials and population of the city. At the more abstract level 
of the implicit theory of assemblage, there are also shifts. Crowds and barricades 
share the property of accumulation, of fl uid and ad hoc relations, of detachment 
and provisionality. This is what, fundamentally, makes them threatening to the 
intended order of the Second Empire. Haussmann wants to be able to treat the 
city as a single, cohesive organism that can be restored to health. Haussmann 
aims to give the city the order of a body, and suppress the order of crowds.10
What has not changed is that the management of social assemblages (the crowd) 
is entangled with the management of built assemblages (the barricades and the 
city). For Haussmann, politics and the design of urban space are not separate 
enterprises. Socio-political and spatial orders are essentially connected. Also in-
variant is the idea that these assemblages can be understood with reference to 
the primitive. Change happened in how these assemblages are seen to form and 
the anxiety they now engender. Social structure is no longer seen to be hierarchi-
cal and benign, but turbulent, disruptive, even essentially violent.
The body of an organic society
Peter Sloterdijk writes that in “the disassembly of social conglomerates into in-
dividualised complex entities, and their recombination into cooperative ensem-
bles, it becomes clear that the formula of the ‘entry of the masses into history’ 
also articulates an architectural problematic” (2007: 64). This problematic is dis-
closed by the spatial diffi culties experienced by revolutionary crowds: “As early 
as the French Revolution, it became evident that its protagonists would have to 
9. On the architecture of the barricades, 
and their reconfi guration of the city, see 
Douglas (2007).
10. For this interpretation of Hauss-
mann’s work, see Benjamin (1999) and 
Jordan (1995).
Fig. 5. Schematic plan of Paris in 1871, 
following Haussmann’s public works; 
and cumulative plan of barricades in 
Paris, 1795–1871 (after Philippe, 1989).
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rely on the buildings of the ancien régime and public urban spaces, particularly 
the squares in front of large buildings, for their gatherings” (2007: 65). Exist-
ing palaces and meeting halls simply could not accommodate either the number 
of participants or the types of event involved, and it was necessary at fi rst to 
commandeer tennis courts, churches, and public squares. What would be the 
architecture of the new social order? This question was not easily resolved and 
remained diffi cult as the political pendulum swung back and forth. The case of 
Viollet-le-Duc is noteworthy.
Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc was among the barricade-builders in 1830, and 
lent his support to the Paris Commune in 1871, although he had worked exten-
sively for the Second Empire government alongside Haussmann. Perhaps due to 
these sympathies he does not seem to have shared Haussmann’s fear of crowds. 
In fact, he was fascinated by crowd spaces. In his second Discourse, he demon-
strates the potential of new materials by proposing spaces for crowds: a concert 
hall, a market. 
Calling for a mixed system of construction, in which cast and wrought 
iron, brick and stone masonry, and even enameled tile infi ll would all 
be developed to maximize their individual capacities in relation to 
one another, Viollet-le-Duc called his invention an ‘organism’ which 
took its place as the next link in a long chain of architectures for mass 
gatherings. (Bergdoll 2000: 232)
Viollet-le-Duc showed a progressive concern for establishing a proper archi-
tecture of the masses. Architecture, in his view, was deeply implicated in the 
development of a new, organic society. For Viollet-le-Duc, architecture is governed 
by a principle of growth, working from the level of the individual joint. Kenneth 
Frampton points out that Viollet-le-Duc, in his Lectures on Architecture (1858-1872), 
does not once use the term space “in a modern sense” (Frampton 1995: 1). Viollet-
le-Duc’s theory of architecture is almost entirely concerned with the practice of 
jointing and assemblage. Viollet-le-Duc’s reading of Gothic order is a response 
to the logic of autonomy that had, at least since Laugier, dominated classicism. 
In it, Viollet-le-Duc sought an organic structural model for an organic society. 
The fascination with an organic logic is played out in Viollet-le-Duc’s painstak-
ing analysis of the Gothic system. A detail of the springing-point of a Gothic 
arch, taken from his Dictionary of French Architecture (1854-1868), illustrates this 
(Fig. 6). The detail is a fragment, an excised portion of a larger structure, which 
is in turn severed into parts. Each severed segment is revealed to be distinctly 
shaped as part of a fl uid whole. The arch is not itself present in any one element, 
but in a line which passes through multiple elements. Unlike Laugier’s discrete 
components, each part of Viollet-le-Duc’s ideal architecture has a niche, and no 
element is autonomous. While Laugier works from an overall diagram, Viollet-
le-Duc works from local relations between individual elements. For Laugier, 
architecture is a fulfi lment of the diagram, and the only rule governing the joints 
of this structure is the principle of discernible detachment. 
The infl uence of Viollet-le-Duc’s organic and tectonic conception of architec-
ture on the development of modernism is well known. But the metaphor of the 
architectural organism, of organic development, was not ultimately progressive. 
Although Viollet-le-Duc responded to Laugier, and refocused his interest on the 
question of connection rather than hierarchy, the sense of a coherent architectural 
order remains. While he addressed new social organisations, Viollet-le-Duc’s 
Fig. 6. Drawing of the springing-point 
of a Gothic arch, Dictionary of French 
Architecture, Eugène-Emmanuel 
Viollet-le-Duc (1854).
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implicit theory of assemblages persists as a descendant of the Laugian ideal: a 
singular architectural body. Although the organism metaphor is shared between 
Viollet-le-Duc and Haussmann, Viollet-le-Duc begins to shift this metaphor to-
wards the interrelations of parts rather than subdivision of wholes. Viollet-le-
Duc attempts to show of Gothic cathedrals, for instance, that the whole is in many 
ways the organic development of a system of parts and details. In this respect he 
betrays, I suggest, the infl uence of a changing implicit theory of assemblages.
Plasmatic assemblages
So far, I have tried to demonstrate the existence of implicit theories of assem-
blage that are manifested in both architectural structures and social structures. 
Rousseau and Laugier share a theory premised on the irreducible discreteness 
of parts. Interest and concern about the behaviour of crowds lead to studies such 
as Le Bon’s, in which a new theory is implicit; one which not only posits a new 
kind of fl at, chaotic assemblage, but codes such assemblages as primitive and 
hostile. Revolutionary barricades threaten the built order of the city in the same 
way that crowds threaten social and political order. Haussmann arrays the fabric 
of the city against barricades, attempting to ensure its conceptual, political, and 
practical manageability. He contends not only against particular crowds but also 
against the very concept of crowds and he does this by appealing to the ancient 
image of the city as a body. Viollet-le-Duc’s organicism is subtly different from 
Haussmann’s, even accounting for the differences in scale and emphasis of their 
respective projects. Where Haussmann works down from an idealised image of 
the whole, Viollet-le-Duc works up from the interrelation of parts.
In what remains of this paper I want to point out a radical, prescient and un-
derexploited analysis of assemblages that arose from the end of the nineteenth 
century, that of sociologist Gabriel Tarde. Although Tarde’s work was not infl u-
ential at the time of its writing, his analysis has been recovered and refurbished 
by several important recent theorists of assemblages and provides a bridge to the 
present for the ideas I have been considering so far.11
According to Tarde, the multiplicitous order of the crowd is not an exception: 
rather, it is the rule, and not only the rule for accumulations of people, but for all 
accumulations. Tarde insisted that it is proper to talk of cellular, atomic, and stel-
lar societies. A body is a society of organs. A mind is a society of thoughts that 
cannot properly be said to belong to it. Bruno Latour explains that for Tarde, “to 
be a society of monads is a totally general phenomenon, it is the stuff of which 
the world is made” (2001: 121). Tarde generalises the structure of the crowd as a 
model for all assemblages, human or nonhuman.12 
Tarde came into direct confl ict with sociologist Émile Durkheim by being funda-
mentally opposed to the idea that the study of societies was the study of unities 
at a scale greater than that of the individual. His Social Laws (1898) criticises the 
fallacy “that in order to see the regular, orderly, logical pattern of social facts, you 
have to extract yourself from their details, basically irregular, and to go upward 
until you embrace vast landscapes panoramically” (Latour 2001: 124). Durkeim’s 
sociological explanations, Tarde felt, explained the detail with respect to the 
large-scale, when it was in fact precisely the large-scale which was in question:
11. Tarde is in fact the source of Le Bon’s 
idea of the group mind, although Le Bon 
misinterprets this by describing it as a 
collective ego. It is perhaps because Le 
Bon‘s anxious simplifi cation of Tarde‘s 
theories appealed to popular conserva-
tism more than the Tarde’s own coun-
terintuitive and (apparently) abstract 
theory that Le Bon was celebrated and 
Tarde almost ignored.
12. Tarde’s concept of societies is taken 
up by Gilles Deleuze (see, for example, 
Deleuze, 2004: 157-58) and, subsequently, 
De Landa (2006).
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Instead of explaining everything by the so called imposition of a law 
of evolution which would constrain larger phenomena to reproduce, to 
repeat themselves in some certain identical order, instead of explain 
the small by the large, the detail by the big, I explain the overall simi-
larities by the accumulation of elementary actions, the large by the 
small, the big by the detail (Tarde 2002a: 21-22, translation by Latour).
Tarde refused the premise shared by both Rousseau and Le Bon that there could 
ever be a point when we could move cleanly from talking of interactions and ties 
at the microscopic scale to analysing the macroscopic operations of a collective. 
Society was, to borrow Latour’s terms, a “confusing plasma ... a brew” instead 
of an edifi ce (Latour 2001: 125). For Tarde, a society is not a greater whole, but a 
radical partiality. Individual elements:
soldiers of those various regiments, provisional incarnations of their 
laws, pertain to them by one side only, but through the other sides, 
they escape from the world they constitute ... [they have] other lean-
ings, other instincts coming from previous enrolments ... [they are] 
made only of sides and facades of beings (124).
The individual is faceted, multiplicitous, split by ‘previous enrolments’, traversed 
by tendencies outside itself. At this point it is worth recalling Laugier’s hut, the 
elements of which report such prior engagements. The branches, although repur-
posed as linear elements, retain the forks, bends and inconsistencies of the tree, 
and the living columns themselves exhibit stumps where their unruly growth 
has been disciplined by the hut-builder. The individual is far more complex than 
its place in a larger unity would indicate. For Tarde, as Latour puts it, “the big 
is never more than the simplifi cation of one element of the small” (123). Each 
branch, Tarde would claim, using the Leibnizian vocabulary of his Monadology 
and Sociology (1893), contains the entire tree monadically, the tree being entailed 
in every branch. We might also recall Viollet-le-Duc’s detail drawing, in which 
individual elements literally commit only certain facets to the whole, or the bar-
ricades comprised of elements with allegiances elsewhere.
Tarde recognises that the emergence of theories of the crowd is not just the 
prompt for a new social theory. It requires a wider-ranging theory of assemblage. 
Tarde has little, if anything, to say about architecture under that name. But the 
theory of assemblage he develops has direct relevance to some of the most fun-
damental architectural questions: how parts are put together in service of some 
greater unity. His thinking may seem excessively abstract, but in fact it is highly 
concrete. What Tarde proposed was that, in any circumstance where we confront 
an assemblage, we should not immediately interpose a greater unity to which it 
belongs, but should examine the processes and networks of interaction at work. 
Put simply, our concern should be formation rather than form. 
Conglomerates as an architectural problematic
When Sloterdijk discerns an “architectural problematic” in the new social as-
semblages of the French Revolution, it is important to recognise that this is not 
merely a matter of society’s implications for architecture, nor conversely, archi-
tecture’s implications for society. Sloterdijk says that the very subjectivity of 
crowds depends on the production of space: 
R09_Douglas_INT10_FINAL.indd   106 11/3/09   2:26 AM
107
the forming of a multitudinous, metropolitan crowd into a present 
mass was an architectural, organisational, and ritual task ... ‘The 
masses’, ‘the nation’, or ‘the people’ can only exist as a collective sub-
ject when the physical assemblage of the magnitudes is the object of 
an elaborate production. (2007: 75)
Architecture, society, culture, technology – these cannot be seen as autonomous 
fi elds, even overlapping ones.
It is admittedly unorthodox to argue that the form of crowds and building 
tectonics can be connected in anything but a symbolic register. To take this 
further step, however, it is only necessary to recognise that both domains are 
structured by a theory of assemblage, even though this theory often remains im-
plicit. Having recognised this, the relationship that Rykwert indicates between 
Rousseau’s social contract and Laugier’s primitive hut can be seen to be more 
than analogical.
I have had two aims in this paper. The fi rst of these has been to indicate the value 
of examining implicit theories of assemblage for historical understanding. The 
organisation of collectives and understandings of architectural organisation de-
scribe an interwoven trajectory. The disengaged assemblage that structures Rous-
seau’s and Laugier’s respective arguments is drastically shifted by theories of the 
crowd. Haussmann, who implicitly shares Le Bon’s theory of assemblage, sets in 
place an architecture of resistance to the crowd, while Viollet-le-Duc’s organi-
cism hints at a reformulation of architecture more sympathetic to the crowd.
My second aim is projective and open-ended: to seek a trajectory for this analysis 
into the present.13 Architectural assemblage and social assemblage should not be 
seen as problems from entirely separate domains. It is not a matter of discerning 
how one domain informs the other, nor a matter of delimiting an area of overlap 
between them. In place of many separate and communicating discourses of as-
semblage, Tarde proposes a unifi ed discourse of assemblages governed by rela-
tions of exteriority.14 His treatment of the structure of crowds and structure of 
architecture as cases of a more general theory of accumulation, conglomeration, 
and multiplicity is a radical restructuring that should drive us to renewed ques-
tioning of the relationship between architecture and society, and would result in 
a more fl uid, precise, and intricate view of both.
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